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The theory of innate ideas, as revived by certain developments in 
transformational grammar, has been the subject of extensive discussion. In 
this paper I shall argue that there are no grounds at present for the claim, 
advanced by rationalist linguists, that one must posit certain highly 
specific items of tacit knowledge (or innate ideas) in order to account for 
linguistic behavior. 
Transformational theory of grammar is taken by some philosopher-
linguists as lending weight to the " rationalist" claim that there is innate 
knowledge. The transformational linguists claim to have discovered 
certain linguistic universals; if, however, the rationalist-oriented linguist is 
to move from the existence of these universals to the presence of innate 
knowledge, he must defend a notion of tacit knowledge. In a recent 
important article, "Tacit Knowledge," Jerrold Katz and several co-authors 
characterize the problem as "whether 'tacit knowledge' can, be made sense 
of in a way that permits us to say that empirically adequate grammars 
explicate what a speaker knows about a language."1 Their aim in 
addressing this problem is to defend Jerry Fodor's claim that speakers of a 
natural language tacitly know the rules governing verbal behavior,2 and to 
.how that Stephen Stich is mistaken in both his criticisms of Fodor and his 
positive claim that we do not need to assume any knowledge on the part of 
.peakers qua speakers. 
Rather than add another line to the usual exchange which rationalist-and 
empiricist-oriented philosophers of language engage in, I shall first 
consider the position which Stich must advocate if his criticisms of Fodor 
are to have any force. This position, however, is indefensible, as I shall 
delI\onstrate . . Second, while granting the reasonableness of crediting a 
speaker with tacit knowledge, I shall show that the "rationalist" linguists 
cannot support their claim that speakers must have certain specific 
"innate ideas". 
I 
. Stich argues against tacit knowledge of what I shall call "linguistic pro-
positions"--these consist of linguistic universals, rules of particular 
grammars, and consequences of the rules and definitions of such a 
grammar. Against the claim that speakers possess such knowledge, Stich 
cites three conditions which he takes to be necessary for knowledge in 
general: 
... when a person knows that p [(a)] he has occasionally reflected that 
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p . .. ; [(b)] he will, if inclined to be truthful ... , assert thatp if asked, [(ell 
More basic still, he is capable of understanding some statement which 
expresses what he knows. Yet for the propositions of linguistic theory 
none of this need be true. People--exempting a few linguists--. " are 
incapable of recognizing the propositions of linquistic theory [i.e., 
linguistic propositions] when presented. 3 
These conditions are satisfied by what Stich calls the "unproblematic cases 
of knowledge," i.e., explicit knowledge. Since they are not satisfied in the 
context of linguistic theory, one must (Stich thinks) provide reasons for 
employing the notion of tacit knowledge in this context. 
As Katz et at. point out, (a) and (b) are not satisfied, but this is to be 
expected given the very notion of tacit knowledge. Thus, if we are to allow 
even the possibility of tacit knowledge, we cannot take (a) and (b) as 
necessary conditions for knowledge. Hence (c) becomes the most significant 
condition. If Stich's claim were that the absence of (c) rules out the 
possibility of tacit knowledge oflinguistic propositions, he would introduce 
a new element into the rationalist-empiricist debate. Now a necessary, 
although not sufficient, condition of someone, A, having tacit knowledge 
that p is that it be possible for A to have explicit knowledge that p. And in 
the passage quoted, Stich might be thought to hold that with regard to 
linguistic propositions, this condition is not met--i.e., that certain people are 
incapable of acquiring such explicit knowledge, not merely in practice but 
in theory. 
In fact, however, Stich does not make this claim, nor would he be justified 
in doing so, The most he is entitled to claim is that at least one person has 
neither reflected on, assented to nor understood some statement of the 
propositions of linguistic theory. But even if this is the case, as it 
undoubtedly is, there is nothing to preclude the possibility of the situation's 
changing and of everyone's coming to be in the position of having the 
explicit knowledge which only linguists presently possess. 
Stich's "incapacity" claim does not amount to much more than a 
statement of the fact that tacit knowledge is not explicit, which no one has 
denied. Hence his entire case rests on showing that there are no reasons 
which warrant positing tacit knowledge. At this point the debate assumes a 
stereotyped form which is representative ofthe recent rationalist-empiricist 
controversy in linguistics. Katz claims, e.g., that the open-ended quality of 
the speaker's knowledge requires that some rules be employed; Stich claims 
that no rules are needed, that the speaker is merely comparing various 
strings of words, and that his judgments do not concern grammatical 
properties at all. 
Rather than enter into this debate, I intend to show that even granting 
tacit knowledge on the part of speakers, the "rationalists" cannot get the 
"innate ideas" they claim to want. Before doing this I must consider a 
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paradox which Stich sees arising from the claim that speakers are capable 
of making judgments concerning the grammatical properties of sentences. 
I shall suggest a way of avoiding this paradox which leaves open the 
possibility of speakers having tacit knowledge. 
II 
According to Stich, if the speaker is making judgments concerning 
grammaticality, this presupposes a complex grammar in terms of which the 
judgments are justified. This situation is paradoxical: the speaker's 
judgments provide the data from which the grammar is constructed, yet the 
justification for these judgments can only be given in terms ofthe grammar 
which the speaker does not possess. 4 In order to avoid this paradox, Stic4 
argues that speakers do not judge strings of words to be grammatical or 
ungrammatical; rather, they merely judge that strings "sound similar to or 
different from those of some specific set [of strings of terms]." These 
judgments express only that knowledge which is acquired upon being 
presented with the particular strings of words.5 Unfortunately, such 
judgments appear incapable of affording data which warrant explanation 
by tacit knowledge. 
There seems, however, to be a half-way house between the positions of 
Stich Rnd Katz. Instead of holding that speakers make judgments 
concerning grammatical properties, we will say that they judge whether 
strings are acceptable, unacceptable or questionable (in the sense that the 
speaker simply does not know how to classify them). While we may lose 
BOrne judgments, e.g., those concerning noun phrases, we will retain enough 
for the construction of grammars. From the data provided by these 
judgments, the linguist constructs a grammar which accounts for the data 
and decides the status of questionable strings.6 This treatment does not 
result in the paradox which Stich mentions, and it leaves open the 
possibility of crediting the native speaker with knowledge beyond that 
allowed by Stich. Judgments concerning acceptability may be presumed to 
require a conceptual framework which is more complex than that required 
for perceptual judgments. 
We can easily imagine, then, that the ability to make such judgments 
presupposes a conceptual framework compatible with tacit knowledge of 
rules, some of which may turn out to be linguistic universals. I shall assume 
henceforth that we do need to posit tacit knowledge of this sort, in order to 
explain both the native speaker's explicit knowledge of the acceptability of 
strings of words and his ability to learn to classify strings according to a 
formalized grammar. Katz et at. characterize this tacit knowledge in terms 
of tacit deductions. A reasonable explanation of tacit deduction might be: 
A person, A, may be said to have tacitly deduced p from r, if p follows 
validly from r; p is not "directly evident"; A is not aware of r; and A's 
aWareness of p cannot be explained in any other way (i.e., by any 
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combination of A's knowledge and/or belief statements). 
A is not of course aware of the deduction. 
Now if we are to claim that A tacitly knows r, then the deduction from rto 
p must be not merely valid, but sound. For if A is to know that r, whether 
tacitly or explicitly, it would be unreasonable to allow for the possibility of 
r's being false. Hence, to support their claim that A tacitly knows that r, 
Katz et al. require something like the following: 
If A knows that p andp is the conclusion of a sound argument which has r 
as the premise, and A's know ledge that p can only be explained in terms of 
a tacit deduction from r, then A tacitly knows that r. 
I find this formally acceptable. The difficulty for the linguists who defend 
tacit know ledge is in the clause" A' s knowledge that p can only be explained 
in terms of a tacit deduction from r." Specifically, the problem is to establish 
that r is the unique explanation of A's knowledge that p. This difficulty 
obviously arises for Fodor's analysis of tacit knowledge in terms of an 
optimal simulation, though Stich curiously fails to consider it. As we shall 
notice, it is a fatal difficulty for the rationalist. 
III 
It seems almost truistic to say that for any pattern of behavior there are 
alternative means of explaining it. Thus in the case at hand, for any natural 
language there are alternative grammars which account for all the data 
and yet are incompatible with each other. Generalizing, it is clear that the 
same holds at the level of linguistic universals; in short, there may be 
alternative incompatible "universal" grammars, all of which accommodate 
the data oflinguistic behavior. In Convention, David Lewis points out that 
unless we have some privileged method of evaluating the alternative 
grammars, we must consider all of them to be on a par.7 Yet Stich, for 
example, simply assumes that there is one grammar which will count as the 
grammar of a language . 
... a grammar is the correct grammar of a language if it is the best 
grammar that accounts for all the data and meets certain further 
restraints.8 
Stich seems unaware of the significance of this assumption, for he neither 
indicates what makes a grammar the "best" grammar, nor specifies the 
character of these further restraints; in short, he fails to give us the 
privileged method of evaluation, a failure he shares with his rationalist 
opponents. 
This is not a trivial oversight. For even if we are willing to admit the 
necessity of some tacit knowledge, more specific claims concerning the 
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innate ideas9 allegedly associated with such knowledge have not yet been 
justified; what must also be shown is that there is one (and only one) 
lI'ammar which counts as the grammar of a language and, moreover, that 
there is one (and only one) set oflinguistic universals which constitutes the 
universal grammar. For this reason, the argument which Katz et al. employ 
in this context either fails to establish its conclusion, or presupposes an 
evaluation procedure which selects one possible grammar as the grammar 
of a language. This argument may be summarized as follows: 
Let R be a rule of a particular grammar; S, a speaker; p a proposition 
affirming some grammatical property of a sentence, 10 and U, the s.et of 
linguistic universals. 
S knows that p. 
S tacitly deducedp from R (or on Fodor's account, "An optimal simulation 
of S's verbal behavior requires the instruction R"). 
Therefore, S tacitly knows that R. 
R is a member of U. 
Therefore, S tacitly knows a rule of linguistic theory. 
To discover the members of U, as pointed out by Fodor, one relies on 
optimal simulations and infers like causes (the rules) from like effects (the 
1erbal behavior).ll If, however, there are alternative sets of instructions 
which explain S's knowledge thatp, the second premise must be changed to: 
An optimal simulation of S's verbal behavior can be achieved by the 
instruction R. 
But now R has lost its special status; S's verbal behavior no longer 
uires that S know R. Thus contrary to Fodor's claim that it makes no 
erence whether the "machine and the organism have only one way of 
ducing the kind of behavior in question,"12 it seems clear that it makes a 
at deal of difference. 
If the "rationalist" linguist intends to defend an historically based 
·ne ofinnate ideas (or items oftacit knowledge), he must therefore meet 
objection which may be illustrated by contrasting instinctive with 
guistic behavior, taking the latter as ostensible support for innate ideas. 
is noteworthy that the explanation of instinctive behavior need not 
" nform (as a conceptual matter) to either of these requirements: that the 
lanation be uniform across the species, or that it be known to the agents 
hose instinctive behavior is at issue. Thus, taking the nest building of 
ows as a case of purely instinctive behavior, any of the following are 
ptable as possible explanations: sparrows have a certain brain 
cture, B, which, under conditions C, produces the nest building 
avior; sparrows' heads contain colonies of very tiny sparrows which 
\Ie orders to sparrows in C directing the nest building; sparrows' heads 
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contain Sony-built components which are programmed to yield nest 
building behavior in C13; sparrows know (tacitly or explicitly) the content of 
such a program which would yield nest building behavior. 
Now in only one case, the last, does the explanation posit even a potential 
item of tacit knowledge; nevertheless, all the explanations are possible 
explanations ofthe sparrows' instinctive behavior. Moreover, it seems that 
we might discover that all of these explanations described some sparrows, 
and that no single explanation was available to cover the behavior in 
question, Although such a discovery might lead to a decision to sub-divide 
the class of sparrows into sub-species (along the lines of the difference in 
explanations of the nest building behavior), there is nothing in the case 
which necessitates such a decision. We might as easily decide to retain one 
species and allow that the behavior has no uniform explanation (just as 
smoking behavior in humans m.ay have no' single explanation). If the 
behavior in question is instinctive, we can tolerate a diversity of 
explanation. 
If, however, our concern is with behavior that is taken as explicable only 
in terms of innate ideas (or items of tacit knowledge), the situation is 
significantly altered. This sort of behavior does require that the 
explanation accommodate both knowledge and uniformity. Any 
explanation of the behavior must provide items which can be the object of 
knowledge. Thus, in the above case, only the final explanation--knowledge 
of rules--would be acceptable if the nest building beha vior were construed on 
the rationalist model of linguistic behavior. But if this requirement is 
satisfied, then in the case oflinguistic behavior the uniformity requirement 
cannot be met, since it is possible to construct mutually incompatible sets of 
rules to explain the linguistic behavior in question. In spite of his well· 
known vagueness, when Descartes spoke of innate ideas he clearly did not 
intend to allow significant interpersonal differences in these ideas. 14 So, 
too, the modern Cartesian linguist cannot maintain his rationalist stance 
while admitting that the specific content of these innate ideas varies across 
persons. 
In short, if we are to follow Fodor and argue from like effects to like causes-
in support of the doctrine of innate knowledge oflinguistic universals--then 
we must argue for like causes. This point may seem too trivial to be worth 
repeating, but Fodor's cavalier attitude toward diverse explanatory 
mechanisms necessitates its emphasis in this context,l5 For if S's verbal 
behavior can be simulated by any of a disjunction of instructions, R or R' or 
R" or ... , and these are incompatible, then they cannot all be members of U. 
Hence, until one can specify a privileged method of evaluating these 
alternative rules of grammar, the most a speaker may be said to knoW 
tacitly is one member ofthis disjunction--but we cannot specify which. This 
blocks the move to tacit knowledge of rules of a particular grammar and, 
hence, to tacit knowledge of linguistic universals. And since this move is 
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cial to defenders of "innate ideas," granting even the necessity of tacit 
owledge is not sufficient to establish their claim until a privileged 
ethod of evaluation is presented. 16 
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